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the reaction to a case in which the Court cannot use a murdered
body 47 as evidence because a "constable has blundered"? 48

A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-DIsMISSAL
OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR INSUBORDINATION IN REFUSING TO ANSWER
QUESTIONS OF INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ON FIFTH AMENDMENT

GROUNDS HELD LAWFUL.-A California statute'

provided that it

was the duty of any state employee subpoenaed before a state or
federal committee to answer any questions concerning membership in
certain organizations. Petitioners, subpoenaed before a congressional
investigative committee, were further ordered by their employer, the
County of Los Angeles, to answer any questions which might be
asked of them. Upon their refusal to do so on fifth amendment
grounds, they were discharged. The United States Supreme Court,
affirming the California Supreme Court, held that the dismissal was
lawful because the Court concluded that petitioners were dismissed
for insubordination in refusing to answer proper questions and not
because they invoked their constitutional privilege. Nelson v. County
of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
"This," as Mr. Justice Brennan sadly remarked, "is another in
the series of cases involving discharges of state and local employees
from their positions after they claim their constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination before investigating committees." 2 The
area has been marked by a series of close decisions and bitter dissents.
In Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,3 city employees were discharged
for their refusal to execute a loyalty affidavit. A declaratory judgment in Adler v. Board of Educ.4 upheld a statute which provided
for the dismissal of state employees knowingly belonging to subversive
organizations as unfit. These earlier cases established the validity
of dismissals based on insubordination or subversive activities casting
doubt on the employee's fitness.5 They rested on the doctrine that
47 See Grant, Circionventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 So. CAL. L. REv.
359, 364-65 (1941).
48 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21. 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
12 CAL GOV'T CODE § 1028.1 (Deering 1958).
Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 10 (1960) (dissenting
opinion).
3341 U.S. 716 (1951) (Frankfurter and Burton, JJ., dissenting in part
in separate opinions; Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting in separate opinions).
4342 U.S. 485 (1952) (Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas, JJ., dissenting
in separate opinions).
5 Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
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the state has a legitimate interest not only in questioning its employees as to matters that prove relevant to their fitness and suitability for public service, 6 but also in the protection of the integrity
and competency of the public service itself. 7 But in attempting to
preserve a constitutional balance between the preservation of state
rights, the
security and the protection of individual constitutional
8
Court remained cautious. In Wienmnn v. Updegraff, another loyalty
oath case in which membership alone was made a disqualifying factor
in excluding an employee from employment, a unanimous Court, impressed by the fact that present or past membership may be innocent,
distinguished Garner and Adler by making proved scienter a necessary element of any dismissal on these grounds. 9
Perhaps the Court was overcautious in the famous case of
Slochower v. Board of Educ. which arose next.10 In that case, 1a
teacher was dismissed when he refused on fifth amendment grounds
to answer questions before a federal committee. The Court, adopting
the spirit of the dissents in Garner and Adler, refused to uphold the
dismissal, reasoning that the invocation of the fifth amendment had
been made the predominant reason for the discharge. 12 The majority further felt that there was no relation between Slochower's
employment and the scope of the committee investigation, and that
there was a basic difference between state or local investigations
directly concerning the employee's fitness and national federal investigations concerning government security.' 3 Besides the basic constitutional test of the grounds for dismissal, therefore, the Slochower
Court established, in addition, the relation of employment to inquiry
and the difference between the scope of state and federal investigations as material considerations in this area. In Beilan v. Board of
EduC.,1 4 the next case, a teacher, refusing to answer questions as to
his membership in subversive organizations asked by his immediate
superintendent and going directly to his fitness as a teacher, was dis-6
missed on the grounds of incompetency.15 And in Lerner v. Casey,'
6See Adler v. Board of Educ., supra note 5, at 492; Garner v. Board of
Pub. Works, supra note 5, at 720.
See Adler v. Board of Educ., supra note 5, at 493; Garner v. Board of
Pub. Works, supra note 5, at 721.
8344 U.S. 183 (1952).
91d. at 188-89.
(Reed, Burton,
10 Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956)
Minton and Harlan, J.J., dissenting).

1 Ibid.

See also Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 7
12 Id. at 558.
(1960); id. at 10 (dissenting opinion).
13 Slochower v. Board of Educ., supra note 10, at 558.
399 (1958) (Warren, Douglas, Black, and Brennan, JJ.,
14 357 U.S.
dissenting).
Is Id. at 400, 406-07.
(Warren, Douglas, Black, and Brennan, JJ.,
16357 U.S. 468 (1958)
dissenting).
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a subway conductor, refusing to answer similar questions by a state
superintendent, was dismissed on the grounds of his doubtful trust
and reliability.17 The Court in both cases, utilizing the Slochower
approach, reasoned that the grounds for dismissal were constitutional,
that there was a valid relation between the employment and the inquiry, and that both cases concerned the scope of inquiry of a state
rather than a federal body.' 8 The minority in the Beilan and Lerner
cases, adhering more closely to the Slochower majority, continued
to suspect that invocation of the fifth amendment was being used as
the basic grounds for dismissal, and that incompetency and doubtful
trust were an evasive disguise of that fact. 19 The same minority,
foreseeing a weakening of the Slochower holding, further contended
in both cases that there was no valid relation between employment
and inquiry, and that the real reason for dismissal had been the
20
invocation of the fifth amendment.
This basic suspicion is also
2
'
case.
evident in the instant Nelson
The first difficulty presented to the Court in all these cases involving employee dismissals has been in determining the precise
grounds for discharge. The reason for dismissal is the legal fulcrum
on which each case ultimately turns. The Slochower case intimated
that where invocation of the fifth amendment privilege is made the
sole grounds for dismissal, the dismissal will not be upheld. 22 But
the point then underlying each case is whether or not the invocation.
in fact, has been made the sole grounds for dismissal. Since
Slochower, it appears that no cases have bottomed the discharge on
the invocation alone. Several other dismissal devices have been employed with varying degrees of success. Each case since Slochower
contains both a refusal to answer and an invocation of fifth amendment
privileges, and it is imperative to note that the constitutionally valid
devices for dismissal rest on the refusal. The employee's refusal,
for instance, may be equated with a breach of duty. Breach of duty
thereby becomes the fulcrum for dismissal, and this device has been
upheld. 23 Similarly, a refusal to answer-nothing more-has been
Id. at 472, 475.
See Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 401, 405, 406-07 (1958)
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 471-72, 474-77 (1958).
19 See Beilan v. Board of Educ., supra note 18, at 411, 416, 424 (dissenting opinions).
20 Id. at 415, 422, 424 (dissenting opinions).
21 Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 9, 13, 14-15 (1960)
(dissenting opinion).
22 Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558 (1956).
23 See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1960)
(breach of statutorily imposed duty); Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S.
399, 405 (1958) (obligation inherent in job); Matter of Cohen, 7 N.Y.2d
488, 166 N.E.2d 672, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1960) (breach of professional duty
and duty of lawyer to court).
17
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equated with insubordination, 24 lack of candor,2 5 or incompetency on
the part of the employee, 20 all of which are fairly close in meaning
and ultimate effect. Dismissals based on these devices have with2
' but the courts have gone out of their
stood the constitutional test,1
way to make it clear that it is the refusal to answer per se that is
ultimately made the2 8basis for discharge rather than invocation of
the fifth amendment.

The validity of these "dismissal devices" based on mere refusal
has been subject to constant challenge by a minority who contend that
each device is merely a convenient way for circumventing constituThe
tional safeguards and circumnavigating the Slochower case .2
gist of minority thought is that whatever "thin patina" we utilize,
we are in practical effect, if not in actual intent, dismissing the emto nothing
ployee for invoking the fifth amendment, and this amounts
s0
more than an unconstitutional procedural short-cut.
In the case at hand, nevertheless, the Court, upholding the power
of the state to predicate discharge on a refusal to give information
concerning security as established in the Garner and Adler cases,
concluded that the dismissal was based on insubordination in refusing
31
to answer, and not because of the reliance on the fifth amendment.
In the opinion of the majority, the reason for refusing to answer was
immaterial. 32 In this regard, therefore, the Court has followed the
trend of the Lerner and Beilan cases, while continuing to pay lip
service to the Slochower case.
Another issue of major importance in cases involving investigative committees is whether the subject matter of the inquiry and
the questions themselves should be relevant to the employee's fitness
or position, if he is to be dismissed for refusing to answer them. It
is significant that this issue was usually considered an important one
in all of the earlier cases. 33 The majority, in these cases, recognizing

24
25

See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, supra note 23, at 3.
See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, supra note 23, at 13 (dis-

senting opinion) ; Beilan v. Board of Educ., supra note 23, at 405; id. at 421
(dissenting opinion); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 476 (1958).
26 See Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 406-07 (1958).
27 See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, supra note 23; Beilan v.
Board of Educ., mupra note 26; Lerner v. Casey, supra note 25.
28 See Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1960); Beilan
v. Board of Educ., supra note 26, at 405-06; Lerner v. Casey, supra note 25,
at 475-76.
29

See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, supra note 28, at 14-15 (dis-

senting opinion) ;'Beilan v. Board of Educ., supra note 26, at 415-16, 423-24

opinions).
(dissenting
3

0 Ibid.
Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, supra note 28, at 6, 7-8.
32 Ibid.
3 See, e.g., Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 401; id. at 415 (1958)
(dissenting opinion) ; Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 474 (1958); Slochower
v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558 (1956); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342
31
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the relevancy of the issue, had adopted the policy that security is a
valid subject of inquiry between an investigative body and any employee even remotely associated with that security.34 But this holding
had never been extended by the Supreme Court to include federal
investigative bodies. 5 In fact, the holding in the Slochower case
was directly opposite. The minority (Slochower) view was that the
connection between inquiry and the sanction of dismissal for refusal
to answer should be properly limited to local investigations directly
concerning the employee's fitness, not nationwide investigations
founded on "national security." 36 The Nelson case disposes of the
federal-state distinction as "not determinative" of the issue and thus
lessens the import of the relation of employment to inquiry.37 As
an extension of the Beilan and Lerner cases to the area of national
investigations, this is a further severe limitation, if not an actual overruling, of the Slochower case.
The Nelson case, therefore, arising at a critical period in the
changing policy of the Court, occupies a position of much significance
in clarifying the law and establishing a firm vantage point for future
decisions. Whereas earlier decisions turned on the constitutional
validity of the grounds for discharge, the relation of employment to
inquiry, and the difference between the scope of federal or state investigative bodies,38 the Nelson case has lessened the import of the
relation of employment to inquiry and has deemed unimportant the
difference between the scope of federal or state investigative bodies.
It thereby establishes as the basic controlling test an investigation of
the dismissal device itself.3 9 In so doing, it has extended the principles of Beilan and Lerner to the area of federal investigations. In
upholding the validity of the California statute and making clear the

U.S. 485, 492-93 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716,
720-21 (1951). See also Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 540-41,

119 N.E2d 373, 379 (1954), revld sub noin. Slochower v. Board of Educ.,
su~pra.
34 See, e.g., Lerner v. Casey, supra note 33, at 474; Adler v. Board of Educ.,
supra note 33, at 492-93; Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, supra note 33, at

720-21.
35 The investigative bodies in every case preceding Nelson (except
Slochower) were all either state or local organs. In the Beilan case, the
teacher was first questioned by his immediate superintendent and later by a
federal committee, the grounds for dismissal turning on the refusal before the
See Beilan v. Board of Educ., st pra note 33, at 401-03. The
New York Court of Appeals had held in Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306
N.Y. 532, 541, 119 N.E.2d 373, 379 (1954), that the state statute applied

superintendent.

equally to a federal legislative committee, thus foreshadowing the Nelson

case, but this holding was reversed by the Supreme Court in the Slochower
case.
36 Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558 (1956).
7 Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, strpra note 28, at 7-8.
38 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 33.
39Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1960).
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precise grounds for dismissal, the Court here has clarified several
doubts that were cast by the Slochower case. It is evident also that
the Nelson case will play a significant role in determining future cases
in the area.40 It is also significant that state courts, adhering to
the Slochower doctrine, have
already begun to distinguish the Nelson
41
case on various grounds.

It is often difficult to decide whether a statute is designed purposely to circumvent the constitutional privilege, to provide a procedural short cut for the dismissal of employees, to include a built-in
inference of guilt or provide an actual punishment for taking the fifth
amendment privilege. But in this area of 5-4 decisions and constantly shifting policies, the Nelson approach-an exact and deliberate
investigation of the ultimate nature, intent, operation and practical
effect of the relevant device of each case-is one answer to a difficult
problem.

CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY-ILLEGALITY

OF PERFORMANCE

HELD

GOOD DEFENSE IN ACTION TO RECOVER ON A VALID CONTRACT.-

Plaintiff was authorized by defendant corporation to secure distribution rights for motion pictures which he subsequently procured by bribing a producer's agent. Upon nonpayment of his
commission, plaintiff brought an action for an accounting. The Court
of Appeals, reversing a judgment of the Appellate Division, held that
"consistent with public morality and settled public policy"' a party
40 See, e.g., Matter of Cohen, 7 N.Y.2d 488, 166 N.E.2d 672, 199 N.Y.S.2d
658, cert. granted, 363 U.S. 810 (1960), in which a New York attorney availed
himself of the constitutional privilege when questioned by a judicial inquiry

concerning unethical legal practices in his own county. The New York court
upheld his disbarment as validly based on the breach of professional duty
and the duty to the court, rather than on the invocation itself. Since the
investigating body was not federal and the scope of inquiry was obviously
intimately associated with the plaintiff's fitness for practice, the case would
appear to be within the holding of the Nelson case.
41 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Intille, - Pa. -, 163 A.2d 420 (1960),
where school teachers were dismissed for incompetency on the basis of their
refusal to answer questions before a congressional committee. In reversing
the lower court and refusing to sustain the dismissal, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the teachers were dismissed for invoking the fifth amendment,
and incompetency had not been proved within the public school code. The
case seems to follow an entire approach left open by Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359
U.S. 535 (1959), namely, that the dismissal must conform to the requirements
of the administrative code of the employer or else it will be immediately

overturned.
IMcConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 465, 471, 166
N.E.2d 494, 497, 199 N.Y.S.2d 483, 487 (1960).

